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This paper introduces the concept of a steepest ascent tariff reform for a small open economy. 
By construction, it is locally optimal in that it yields the highest gain in utility of any feasible 
tariff reform vector of the same length. Accordingly, it provides a convenient benchmark for 
the evaluation of the welfare effectiveness of other well known tariff reform rules, as e.g. the 
proportional and the concertina rules. We develop the properties of this tariff reform, 
characterize the sources of the potential welfare gains from tariff reform, use it to establish 
conditions under which some existing reforms are locally optimal, provide geometric 
illustrations and compare welfare effectiveness of reforms using numerical examples. 
Moreover, being a general concept, we apply it to the issue of market access and examine its 
implications. Overall, the paper’s contribution lies in presenting a theoretical concept where 
the focus is upon the size of welfare gains accruing from tariff reforms rather than simply 
with the direction of welfare effects that has been the concern of the literature. 
JEL Code: F15. 
Keywords: steepest ascent tariff reforms, piecemeal tariff policy, welfare, market access, 




Copenhagen Business School 
Department of Economics 




Alan D. Woodland 
Econometrics & Business Statistics 
School of Economics & Political Science 







June 29, 2006 
Early discussions with Daniel Primont are gratefully acknowledged, as are the valuable 
comments on an earlier draft of the paper by Jim Anderson, Erwin Diewert, Arja Turunen-
Red, participants at the CESifo conference on Global Economy in Munich, and seminar 
participants at Aarhus, Copenhagen, and Nottingham. The research was supported by the 
Australian Research Council and by EPRU, whose activities are financed by the Danish 
National Research Foundation. Carol Farbotko and Ponnuthurai Ainkaran provided valuable 
editorial assistance. 1 Introduction
The welfare implication of tariﬀ reform in a small open economy has been the subject of
many papers in the literature in international trade. There is now a well-established set
of results that provide conditions under which welfare will rise in response to particular
tariﬀ reforms. The most general result is that a proportional reduction in tariﬀ rates
will raise welfare in a single-household economy provided only that a weak normality
condition holds on preferences. Another result, known as the concertina theorem, is that
the reduction of the tariﬀ rate on the imports of a single commodity will raise welfare if
that good has the highest ad valorem tariﬀ rate and it is a net substitute for every other
good. Such results fall into the class of problems of the second best.1
W h i l et h i si sa ne x t e n s i v eb o d yo fl i t e r a t u r e , it is a general feature of the literature
that each potential reform is treated separately and the main concern is with whether
welfare rises or falls. Within this context, the main purposes of the present paper are to
propose a new tariﬀ reform concept and to use this new concept to provide a framework
within which all particular tariﬀ reforms can be compared in terms of their eﬀectiveness
in generating welfare gains. In this sense, while the literature on tariﬀ reforms has been
focused on the sign of the welfare eﬀect of a tariﬀ reform, we focus on the relative sizes
of these welfare eﬀects induced by diﬀerent reform rules.
Accordingly, to this end, we propose a tariﬀ reform that is locally optimal amongst all
feasible tariﬀ reforms. We refer to this reform as the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform,s i n c et h e
idea for it arises from the steepest ascent algorithm designed to numerically maximize a
function of several variables. Starting at an equilibrium established under an initial tariﬀ
setting, we formulate the diﬀerential tariﬀ reform problem as one of choosing an arbitrarily
small tariﬀ change vector that will raise welfare. There will generally be a set of such
tariﬀ reform directions that are welfare improving. We formulate the locally optimal
tariﬀ reform problem as one of choosing a direction of reform that maximizes the gain
in welfare, subject to the feasible set of tariﬀ reforms belonging to a sphere of arbitrarily
1The early literature on tariﬀ reform in open economies includes Meade (1955), followed by Lloyd
(1974), Hatta (1977a, 1977b) and Fukushima (1979). More recent contributions to this literature include
Abe (1992), Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989, 1991), Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991),
Anderson and Neary (1992, 1996) and Neary (1995).
2small radius. We show that the locally optimal, or steepest ascent, tariﬀ reform is one
that has a direction of change proportional to the gradient of the indirect utility function
with respect to the tariﬀ vector. While the concept of a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform
has not previously appeared in the international trade literature (to our knowledge), it is
closely related to, and inspired by, the concept of an optimal tax perturbation introduced
into the tax reform literature by Diewert (1978, p.152). In a similar vein to our reform
concept, Tirole and Guesnerie (1981) make use of a related gradient projection tax reform
in a closed economy with many consumers and a social welfare function, but they do not
compare reforms as is done here. The idea of locally optimal tax changes is also behind
Weymark’s (1981) concept of undominated directions of tax reform but he does not make
use of a steepest ascent tax reform.
Our steepest ascent tariﬀ reform concept is used in the paper to develop new results
in the theory of tariﬀ reform in a small open economy. First, we characterize the steepest
ascent tariﬀ reform and develop some of its properties. Being proportional to the gradient
of the indirect utility function, it may be evaluated knowing the initial tariﬀ vector and the
net substitution matrix at the initial equilibrium. We are able to show that the steepest
ascent tariﬀ reform applied to the tariﬀs of all traded goods requires at least one tariﬀ
rate to rise and at least one tariﬀ rate to fall as part of the reform. The proportional and
concertina tariﬀ reforms each violate this requirement in general. We also show, however,
that if there is a concertina good then the steepest ascent reform requires that the tariﬀ
on this good be reduced as part of the reform.
Second, by comparing the results of applying the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform concept
to the cases where all tariﬀ rates are subject to the reform and where only the tariﬀso n
non-numeraire goods are permitted to be reformed, we establish that the latter involves a
welfare loss compared to the former reform. That is, if we restrict the tariﬀ reform vectors
to be of equal length, it matters a great deal as to whether the tariﬀ reform is applied
to the tariﬀ of all goods or only to those of non-numeraire goods. This may appear at
ﬁrst glance to contradict the well-known result that homogeneity considerations allow the
equivalent analyses of tariﬀso ne i t h e ra l lo rn o n - n u m e r a i r eg o o d s ,b u tt h i si sn o tt h ec a s e
as will be demonstrated below. Since the literature on tariﬀ reforms has been focused on
3the sign of the welfare eﬀect of a tariﬀ r e f o r ma n dn o tu p o ni t ss i z e ,t h ei s s u ew er a i s e
here about the welfare loss associated with restricting reforms to non-numeraire goods
has not previously been considered. Given our focus on the relative sizes of welfare gains
from diﬀerent tariﬀ reforms, this issue is of signiﬁcant policy importance.
Third, we use the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform concept to provide a characterization
of the sources of the potential welfare gains from tariﬀ reform in terms of measures of the
level and dispersion of initial tariﬀ rates. These are measured by two characterizations
of the level and dispersion of initial tariﬀ distortions - the generalized average tariﬀ and
the generalized variance of tariﬀs-d e ﬁned using the substitution matrix. The greater is
the generalized average tariﬀ rate, or the greater is the generalized variance of tariﬀs, the
greater is the potential increase in welfare from tariﬀ reforms. These generalized mean
and variance measures of the distortions provided by the initial tariﬀsd i ﬀer from, but
are inspired by, measures of the same name recently proposed by Anderson and Neary
(2006) for the evaluation of arbitrary tariﬀ reforms. We apply their measures to our
steepest ascent tariﬀ reform and argue that the two sets of measures have diﬀerent, but
complementary, objectives and interpretations.
Fourth, we undertake a comparison of the proportional, univariate and steepest ascent
tariﬀ reforms. Since the latter is the locally optimal tariﬀ reform, it provides a convenient
b e n c h m a r kb yw h i c ha l lt a r i ﬀ reforms may be measured. We establish several results
concerning this comparison. In particular, we characterize the conditions under which
the proportional tariﬀ reform and the univariate tariﬀ reform are locally optimal. We
also provide a geometric illustration of these reforms and show that the more acute the
angle between a reform and the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, the greater will be its welfare
eﬃciency. In doing this, we develop a new index that measures the welfare eﬀectiveness
of any tariﬀ reform. Two numerical examples are used to provide concrete measures of
the relative eﬃciency of the proportional and univariate reforms in raising welfare.
Fifth, we demonstrate that our steepest ascent reform concept may be applied to any
policy objective by examining, e.g., the issue of market access, recently investigated by
Ju and Krishna (2000) and Anderson and Neary (2006). We show the implications of the
steepest ascent tariﬀ reform for market access, and then construct a tariﬀ reform that is
4the best (i.e. locally optimal) for raising market access and show its welfare implications.
We show a surprising "duality" in these eﬀects.
Since the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform is locally optimal in the sense that it yields
the highest level of utility of any feasible tariﬀ reform of equal length, it provides an
important benchmark for the evaluation of the welfare eﬃciency of any proposed tariﬀ
reform for an economy. As such, it represents a valuable theoretical concept where the
focus is upon the size of welfare gains accruing from welfare reforms rather than simply
with the direction of welfare eﬀects that has been the concern of the literature. In addition
to having this theoretical role, the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform can be made operational
provided information is available on the net substitution matrix for the economy at the
initial equilibrium as well as the initial tariﬀs. Increasingly, detailed empirical estimations
and computable general equilibrium models are coming available for many countries thus
making the concept of practical as well as theoretical interest.
2 Small Open Economy and Steepest Ascent Tariﬀ
Reforms
We consider a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy
that trades in n internationally tradeable commodities. The model may be expressed as
p
0Sπ(π,u)=b, (1)
in terms of the world price vector p (p0 denotes the transpose of a vector), the domestic
price vector π = p + t, the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ vector t, the representative agent’s utility level
u and the transfers abroad b.2 In this speciﬁcation, S(π,u) ≡ E(π,u) − G(π) is the net
expenditure function, being the diﬀerence between the consumer expenditure function
E and the gross domestic product function G.A l s o , Sπ(π,u) ≡∇ πS(π,u) denotes the
gradient of the net expenditure function with respect to prices and represents the vector
2The analysis may also be undertaken using ad valorem tariﬀ rates or tariﬀ factors. This task is
undertaken in the Appendix.
5of compensated net import functions. Equation (1) is the country’s budget constraint,
which requires that the value at world prices, p,o ft h en e ti m p o r tv e c t o r ,Sπ,b ee q u a l
to the net transfers from abroad, b.I fb =0 , then the budget constraint simply requires
t h a tt h e r ei saz e r ob a l a n c eo ft r a d e .
Let Sππ ≡∇
2
πS(π,u)=∇πSπ(π,u) be the substitution matrix, measuring the response
of compensated net imports to changes in prices, and let Sπu ≡∇ πuS(π,u)=∇uSπ(π,u)
b eav e c t o ro f" i n c o m e "e ﬀects, measuring the response of compensated net imports to
changes in utility. It is assumed that the Hatta normality condition, p0Sπu > 0,h o l d s .
It is well known that the substitution matrix, Sππ, is a symmetric, negative semideﬁnite
matrix satisfying the homogeneity identity that π0Sππ(π,u) ≡ 0 for all domestic price
vectors, π.
The budget constraint (1) may be solved for utility, u, as a function of the world price
vector, p,a n dt h et a r i ﬀ vector, t. This yields the indirect utility function U(t;p),w h i c h
m a yb ew r i t t e nm o r es i m p l ya sU(t) since the world price vector is assumed to remain
ﬁxed and so may be subsumed.
2.1 Steepest Ascent Tariﬀ Reforms
We consider piecemeal reforms of tariﬀs. However, rather than simply consider all such
reforms or some special cases, we wish to characterize piecemeal reforms that are locally
optimal. That is, we want to ﬁnd the direction vector, δ,t h a tm a x i m i z e st h ed i ﬀerential
change in utility. Such a direction of reform is then said to be locally optimal.
Suppose that the initial tariﬀ vector is t0. The gradient of the indirect utility function
at this initial point is ∇U(t0) and the directional derivative (in direction δ)a tt h i si n i t i a l
point is expressed as D(t0,δ)=∇U(t0)0δ.3,4 This directional derivative indicates the
3Let f be a numerical function deﬁn e do na no p e ns e tX in Rn and let x ∈ X.L e t δ ∈ Rn.T h e
directional derivative of f at x0 in direction v is
Dδf(x0) ≡ limh→0
f(x0 + hδ) − f(x0)
h
,
when the limit exists. See, for example, Apostol (1957, 104-105).
4The directional derivative is related to the recent work by Fare and Primont (2006) on directional
duality theory.
6slope of the indirect utility function in the direction δ.W e w i s h t o ﬁnd a direction
that maximizes the slope of the indirect utility function, since this is the direction of
ad i ﬀerential (piecemeal) tariﬀ reform that yields the greatest improvement in utility;
reforms of tariﬀs in all other directions will yield lower increases in utility.5 For this task
to be well deﬁned, it is necessary to impose a restriction on the direction vectors to ensure
that they are of equal length. Accordingly, feasible direction vectors are restricted to lie






,w h e r el is chosen to be arbitrarily small,
and where kδk ≡ (δ
0
δ)1/2 deﬁnes the Euclidean length of the vector δ.






0δ : δ ∈ C(l)
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. (2)
It will be readily recognized that such reforms of tariﬀ rates correspond exactly to changes
implied by the steepest ascent algorithm for the maximization of the indirect utility
function. Accordingly, we deﬁne the solution for δ to the problem deﬁned by (2) as the
steepest ascent tariﬀ reform (SATR) direction. The solution for δ is given by
δ
S = θ∇U(t
0),θ > 0, (3)
where ∇U(t0) is the gradient vector, whose elements are the partial derivatives ∂U(t0)/∂ti,i=
1,2,...,n,a n dw h e r eθ = l/k∇U(t0)k is a positive scalar.6 While equation (3) provides
the solution for the tariﬀ reform direction vector of length l, δ
S,t h esteepest ascent tar-
iﬀ reform may be expressed more generally as a change in the tariﬀ vector of the form
dt = δ
Sdα,dα > 0, where the scalar dα indicates the size of the tariﬀ reform.
In the present context, it can be shown that the gradient of the indirect utility function
5Of course, some directions may yield lower utility.
6The steepest ascent algorithm provides the motivation for our locally optimal tariﬀ reform. The
steepest ascent algorithm uses this direction and a step size to move to a new tax point from an initial or
starting point, this move constituting the ﬁrst iteration. Having reached a new point, the same steepest
ascent method is used to move to the next tax point. The algorithm converges once the gradient becomes
suﬃciently close to the zero vector. In our context, one can imagine a sequence of small discrete tariﬀ
reforms, each of which is restricted to a sphere of radius l, chosen to be some small scalar. If this algorthm
converges, then the point of convergence will be a local optimum. For a description and properties of
the steepest ascent algorithm for the unconstrained maximization of a function of several variables see,










where π0 = p+t0 is the domestic price vector and u0 is the utility level at the initial tariﬀ
vector t0.7 Accordingly, we can use this result to obtain the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform
as in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The steepest ascent tariﬀ reform is given by dt = δ






λ = θ/H > 0 and H ≡ p0Sπu(π0,u 0) > 0 is the Hatta normality term.
The interpretation of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform may be assisted by reference to
Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows iso-utility contours in domestic price space with just two
commodities. These indiﬀerence curves are rays emanating from the origin due to the fact
that the net expenditure function is homogeneous of degree one and, hence, the indirect
utility function is homogeneous of degree zero, in domestic prices. Point A (corresponding
to free trade, with the domestic price vector equalling the world price vector, p)i st h e
highest utility point corresponding to free trade, but all points along the ray through A
h a v et h es a m eu t i l i t y .P o i n tB denotes the initial domestic price vector arising from the
initial tariﬀ vector t0, which involves an import tariﬀ on good 1 and free trade in good 2.
The tangent to the indiﬀerence curve passing through point B is the indiﬀerence curve
itself and orthogonal (at right angle) to the tangent is the gradient vector, as depicted.
This gradient vector indicates the direction of steepest ascent at the point B,a n ds oi s
the direction of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform. This reform requires a decrease in the
tariﬀ rate on good 1 but an increase in the tariﬀ rate on good 2 (which is initially zero).
7To obtain this result, totally diﬀerentiate (1) to get p0Sπu(π0,u 0)du+p0Sππ(π0,u 0)dt =0 . Because the
net expenditure function is homogeneous of degree zero in domestic prices, it follows that the substitution
matrix Sππ must obey the identity π0Sππ(π,u0) ≡ 0 for all domestic price vectors π.N o t i n gt h a tπ = p+t,
this identity may be expressed as t0Sππ(π,u0) ≡− p0Sππ(π,u0). The above total derivative may then be
written as p0Sπu(π0,u 0)du − t00Sππ(π0,u 0)dt =0 . Thus, we obtain the eﬀect of a change in tariﬀsu p o n
utility as du = t00Sππ(π0,u 0)dt/p0Sπu(π0,u 0). This provides the formula for the gradient of the indrect
utility function with respect to the tariﬀ vector as expressed in the text.
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Figure 2: Steepest Ascent Tariﬀ Reform and Continuous Reform Path
Figure 2 illustrates the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform for an economy with three traded
goods. To facilitate this illustration in two dimensions, we assume that good 3 is the
9n u m e r a i r eg o o d ,t h a tt h et a r i ﬀ on this good is zero and that the tariﬀ reform is restricted
to the non-numeraire goods (as is the common custom in the literature). The ﬁgure
shows the iso-utility contours in the domestic price space for the non-numeraire goods.
Point A is the highest utility point corresponding to free trade. Point B denotes the
initial domestic price vector arising from the initial tariﬀ vector t0. The tangent to the
indiﬀerence curve passing through point B is depicted in the ﬁgure, as is the gradient
vector, which is orthogonal to the tangent of the indiﬀerence curve at point B.A si nt h e
previous ﬁgure, this vector indicates the direction of steepest ascent at the point B.T h i s
is the direction of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform.
Figure 2 also illustrates a path of a continuum of steepest ascent tariﬀ reforms. At
each point on the path, the direction of change is the direction of steepest ascent. Clearly,
this path ends at the global maximum of the indirect utility function, since it has been
implicitly assumed that there is a unique local maximum.8
2.2 Properties of Steepest Ascent Tariﬀ Reforms
The steepest ascent tariﬀ reforms have several interesting and useful features that we now
record and discuss.
First, it is shown that, not surprisingly, steepest ascent tariﬀ reforms always increase
utility except at a (local) optimum. To see this, we calculate the value of the directional
derivative D(t0,δ)=∇U(t0)0δ at the optimally chosen direction.9 In the tariﬀ reform


















S > 0. (6)
8This ﬁgure thus illustrates the (continuous version of the) steepest ascent algorithm for the maxi-
mization of the indirect utility function.
9I ng e n e r a lt h i si sg i v e nb ydUS/dα = D(t0,δ
S)=∇U(t0)0δ
S = θ∇U(t0)0∇U(t0) > 0, where the
inequality follows because the inner product of any vector with itself is positive (unless the vector is the
null vector), being the sum of squares of its elements. This inequality establishes that the steepest ascent
tariﬀ reform always raises welfare, irrespective of the initial tariﬀ vector or the nature of the economy,
provided that the gradient of the utility function does not vanish.
10Being the inner product of the direction vector δ
S with itself, the directional derivative
is positive provided δ
S = λSππ(π0,u 0)t0 6=0 . Turunen-Red and Woodland (2001) deﬁne
the vector Sππ(π0,u 0)t0 as a "local measure of tariﬀ distortion", each element measuring
the distortion for each good. Accordingly, we see that the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform
yields an increase in utility provided there is at least one good that has a tariﬀ distortion,
as deﬁned by Turunen-Red and Woodland. Clearly, the increase in utility will be zero if,
and only if, δ
S = λSππ(π0,u 0)t0 =0 , which means that there are no tariﬀ distortions.10
A second property is not obvious and has important implications for locally optimal
tariﬀ reforms.
Proposition 2 Steepest ascent (locally optimal) tariﬀ r e f o r m so na l lg o o d sr e q u i r ea n
increase in the tariﬀ rate of at least one product and a decrease in the tariﬀ rate of at
least one product.








since π00Sππ(π0,u 0)=0from the homogeneity properties of the net expenditure function.
Since π0 is positive, by assumption, it is clear that δ
S has to have both positive and
negative elements.
This proposition is interesting, since the conventional wisdom is that one gets wel-
fare improvements by reducing tariﬀ distortions. However, according to this proposition,
locally optimal reforms require that the tariﬀ rate on at least one product be increased
along with a reduction in the tariﬀ on at least one other product.11 Of course, as usual,
we have to be careful here in the interpretation of the proposition as the ‘tariﬀ’ is really
10In general, this does not necessarily mean that t0 =0 . For example, there will be no distortions if
there are non-zero tariﬀs but the substitution matrix vanishes (Sππ =0 ). This is the case if equilibrium
occurs where the production possibilities frontier and the indiﬀerence curve have a "corner". In general,
no tariﬀ distortions imply that t0 = κπ0 if Sππ has maximal rank n − 1,s i n c eπ00Sππ(π0,u 0)=0from
the homogeneity properties of the net expenditure function. In this case, t0 is proportional to the world
price vector p, a special case of which is t0 =0 .
11The proposition does not apply to the case where the tariﬀ reform is restricted to non-numeraire
goods, which is dealt with in the next subsection.
11at r a d et a x-at a r i ﬀ on an imported good, but a subsidy on an exported good. The
importance of this proposition will be developed further below.
It is evident from the expression for the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform that the sign
structure of δ
S depends upon the initial tariﬀ vector, t0, and the initial substitution
matrix, Sππ(π0,u 0), and upon how these combine. To get some understanding of this
relationship, we write out the elements of δ
S in component form and express them in
a form that lends itself to interpretation. Speciﬁcally, we examine the steepest ascent
direction of reform to determine situations when a tariﬀ on a good will be reduced and
situations when the tariﬀ will be raised.
The locally optimal direction for tariﬀ reform may be expressed as follows. In this






















j,i =1 ,2,...,n. (7)
This expression gives an indication of how the locally optimal direction of tariﬀ change
relates to the (cross-product) substitution terms Sij and the ad valorem (with domestic




In general, expression (7) indicates the requirements for a locally optimal reform to
involve an increase (δ
S
i > 0) or a decrease (δ
S
i < 0)i nt h et a r i ﬀ rate on a good i.T h e
higher is the tariﬀ on good i relative to other tariﬀ rates and the more substitutable good
i is with other goods, the more likely it is that a locally optimal tariﬀ reform involves a
reduction in the tariﬀ on good i. Conversely, if good i is complementary with a good j
(Sij < 0) and it has a lower tariﬀ than j then that combination contributes to a reduction
in the tariﬀ rate on good i. That is about as much that (7) allows us to say in general.
However, more precise statement may be made if we are prepared to make assumptions
about the initial tariﬀs and the sign structure of the initial substitution matrix. To
illustrate this point and to thereby get a better understanding of this expression, consider
a concertina commodity. We say that good i is a concertina commodity if (a) σ0
i −σ0
j > 0
12for all j 6= i and (b) Sij(π0,u 0) > 0 for all j 6= i. Thus, good i is a concertina commodity if
it has the highest ad valorem tariﬀ r a t ea n di ti san e ts u b s t i t u t ef o ra l lo t h e rg o o d s .U n d e r
this deﬁnition, we see that the right hand side of (7) is negative. Thus, the locally optimal
tariﬀ reform involves a reduction in the tariﬀ rate on a concertina good.12 Accordingly, we
get a very precise result from (7) if good i has concertina good properties: if a concertina
good exists, the steepest ascent reform demands that its tariﬀ be reduced as part of the
reform.13
Proposition 3 If a concertina good exists, the steepest ascent reform demands that its
tariﬀ be reduced as part of the reform.
Of course, there can be at most a single concertina good so there always remains the
issue of whether the tariﬀso nt h en o n - c o n c e r t i n ag o o d sr i s eo rf a l la sp a r to ft h es t e e p e s t
ascent reform. As a ﬁnal observation, it is important to distinguish the above proposition
from the well-known concertina theorem. This theorem states that a unilateral reduction
of the tariﬀ on a concertina commodity (as deﬁned above) is guaranteed to raise welfare.
By contrast, our steepest ascent tariﬀ reform involves the reform of all tariﬀs. What the
above proposition establishes is that, as part of that reform, the tariﬀ on a concertina
good is to be reduced.
2.3 Restricted or Normalized Reforms
Because the indirect utility function is homogeneous of degree zero in domestic prices,
only relative domestic prices matter. Accordingly, without any loss in generality, the
(positive) domestic price of one good (say the ﬁrst) can be normalized by setting it equal
to the world price of the ﬁrst good (for example), thus implying that the tariﬀ on this
12Those familiar with the proof that a reduction on the tariﬀ of a concertina good (alone) is welfare
improving will observe that this is almost the same as that proof. To prove the concertina theorem, we




j. This is precisely
what we have done, since our locally optimal direction is proportional to the gradient of the indirect
utility function.
13On the other hand, if good i satisﬁes property (b) but has the lowest ad valorem tariﬀ rate (the
opposite of property (a)), then the right hand side of (7) is positive and so the tariﬀ rate on such a good
is to be raised. Again, we get a precise result.
13good has been set to zero. Because of this, it is customary to choose the ﬁrst good as the
numeraire (with unit price) and to assume that its tariﬀ is zero and remains such in the
tariﬀ reform process.
To invoke these assumptions, we choose good 1 as the numeraire whose tariﬀ is set at
zero and deﬁne π0 =( 1 ρ0), p0 =( 1 q0) and t0 =( 0 τ0).T h u s ,q denotes the world price
vector for non-numeraire goods, ρ denotes the domestic price vector for non-numeraire
goods and τ denotes the vector of tariﬀs on non-numeraire goods. The substitution matrix
may be similarly decomposed.
Invoking these assumptions, it is evident that the steepest ascent reform requires us
to only use the gradient without the ﬁrst element. Thus, the steepest ascent direction for






0,λ ρ > 0, (8)
where λρ = θρH−1 and θρ is the scalar needed to ensure that δ
S
ρ is of length l. The change
in utility arising from the tariﬀ reform dτ = δ
S
ρdα, dα > 0,i sg i v e nb y
dU
S









0 > 0. (9)
These two expressions, for the direction of tariﬀ reform and the resulting change in utility,
depend only upon the portion of the substitution matrix relating to non-numeraire goods,
Sρρ.
It is customary in the literature to assume that the numeraire good is not subject to
tariﬀs and that the tariﬀ reform is therefore restricted to non-numeraire goods. This can
always be done without loss of generality, as is well known. The reasons for this custom
being valid are that the equilibrium is homogeneous of degree zero in domestic prices
(only price ratios matter) and that the equilibrium domestic price ratios can be obtained
by an inﬁnity of tariﬀ vectors. Accordingly, to obtain a unique tariﬀ vector it is required
that the tariﬀ vector be normalized in some way. Speciﬁcally, the tariﬀ vector can always
be chosen with the tariﬀ rate on any one good being zero and it is customary to choose
this good to be the numeraire. The consequence is that we can undertake our analysis
14of tariﬀsi nam o d e lw h e r et h e r ei san u m e r a i r et h a ti sn o tt a x e da n dn o ts u b j e c tt ot h e
tariﬀ reform or, equivalently, undertake the analysis using all goods. The equilibrium for
all quantities will be unaﬀected by this choice.
This point may be illustrated in Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, good 2 is the numeraire and
point B is the domestic price vector that corresponds to a tariﬀ on good 1 and free trade
in good 2. A reform that moves the domestic price vector to point C involves changes
in both tariﬀs. Because the indirect utility function is homogeneous of degree zero in
domestic prices, an equivalent equilibrium occurs at point D.A t p o i n t D the domestic
p r i c er a t i oi st h es a m ea sa tp o i n tC, while the tariﬀ vector has been changed so that
there is a (now lower) tariﬀ on good 1 but no tariﬀ on good 2. Thus, the argument goes,
we can always do this and so we may as well restrict our tariﬀ analysis to the reform of
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Figure 3: Complete and Restricted Tariﬀ Reforms
In the present context of piecemeal tariﬀ reform in which the tariﬀ reform vector is
restricted, say to a sphere of radius l, this equivalence breaks down. The reason for the
diﬀerence in result is that, in the present context, we do not have the freedom in choice of
tariﬀs to ensure this equivalence. To demonstrate the validity of this statement, we utilize
15Figure 3. In that ﬁgure, the move from initial point B to point C constitutes a reform of
all tariﬀs. The equivalence argument (expressed above) is that this new domestic price
point C can be contracted to point D, which is welfare equivalent, by a suitable choice of
change of tariﬀst oat a r i ﬀ vector that has a zero tariﬀ on good 2 (here the numeraire).
That option is not open to the tariﬀ authority if the tariﬀ reform vector is to lie on
t h es p h e r eo fr a d i u sl (shown with centre B and radius the length of vector BC). A
contraction of domestic price vector C to one that involves no tariﬀ on the numeraire
good necessarily takes us to point D. However, point D lies outside the sphere of radius l
t h a ti sc e n t r e do np o i n tB.At a r i ﬀ reform from B in the direction of D o ft h es a m el e n g t h
as the reform from B to C,s h o w na sp o i n tE,m u s tf a l ls h o r to fp o i n tD. Accordingly, the
reform of the non-numeraire tariﬀs alone cannot be as welfare improving as the reform of
all tariﬀs. Thus, reforms of the tariﬀs of non-numeraire goods only is not equivalent to
reforms of the tariﬀs of all goods of the same length. There is a welfare loss to restricting
attention to non-numeraire goods imposed by the constraint of restricting the reforms to
be in the same sphere. Thus, we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that tariﬀ reforms are restricted to a sphere of radius l.T h e n
at a r i ﬀ reform on non-numeraire goods only involves a welfare loss compared to a tariﬀ
reform of the tariﬀso na l lg o o d s .
This proposition has important implications for the comparison of the welfare eﬀec-
tiveness of diﬀerent tariﬀ reforms. It must be carefully interpreted, however. Clearly, it
is the restriction of a policy reform to a subset (here a sphere) of the tariﬀ space that
is the important premise underlying this proposition. By imposing this restriction, the
opportunity to take any resulting domestic price vector and contract it along a price ray
to a point where the tariﬀ on the numeraire good is zero is removed.
The more basic question that needs to be addressed is that of why such a restriction
is relevant. It is not relevant if the task at hand is to determine the welfare implications
of a particular tariﬀ reform or to construct a tariﬀ reform. In this case, the analysis can
proceed using either the full tariﬀ vector or the restricted tariﬀ v e c t o r . I ti sr e l e v a n t ,
however, if the primary purpose is to compare the welfare eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent policy
16reforms. To provide a basis for comparison, the permissible reforms should be restricted
to the same set. If they are not, then the welfare eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent reforms may
be due to choosing reforms that are of diﬀerent sizes. We wish to compare diﬀerent tariﬀ
reforms and so the proposition is relevant to our task.
3 Sources of Potential Welfare Gains
It was shown above that the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform is welfare improving and is
locally optimal in that it provides the highest level of welfare increase of any tariﬀ reform
of the same length. Here we show that the increase in welfare may be expressed in terms
of two "suﬃcient statistics" that fully describe the distortions in the tariﬀ structure. We
call these the generalized mean and generalized variance, but it must be emphasized that
these are diﬀerent from (but inspired by) the concepts of the same name introduced by
Anderson and Neary (2006).
3.1 A Welfare Gain Decomposition
The change in welfare is expressed by (9). We explicitly deal with a tariﬀ reform on
non-numeraire goods only, the tariﬀ on the numeraire being set to zero. This is without
loss of generality, since the purpose here is to measure the welfare eﬀects of a tariﬀ reform
and not to compare several reforms. To simplify notation, we write Σ = Sρρ(π0,u 0) and
let τ be the initial tariﬀ vector of non-numeraire goods (without the 0 superscript). Thus,
the welfare change arising from the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform applied to non-numeraire






where η = λ
2
ρ/θρ = θρ/H2 is a scalar. This expression may be rewritten in terms of
new concepts describing the level and dispersion of the initial tariﬀ rates, namely the
generalized mean tariﬀ rates and the generalized variances and covariances of the tariﬀ
rates, as demonstrated in the following proposition.






0Στ = V + sτ
2, (11)
where s ≡ ι0Σ0Σι>0, τ ≡ ι0Σ0Στ/s and V ≡ (τ − ιτ)0Σ0Σ(τ − ιτ).
Proof. Consider any scalar τ and let ι be a vector of ones. Write the change in
utility as η−1dUS/dα = τ0Σ0Στ =( τ −ιτ +ιτ)0Σ0Σ(τ −ιτ +ιτ)=( τ −ιτ)0Σ0Σ(τ −ιτ)+
τ2ι0Σ0Σι+2(τ −ιτ)0Σ0Σιτ.Deﬁning V ≡ (τ −ιτ)0Σ0Σ(τ −ιτ),t h eﬁrst term is V .D e ﬁning
s ≡ ι0Σ0Σι>0, the second term becomes sτ2. Finally, the third term becomes zero if we
deﬁne τ as τ ≡ ι0Σ0Στ/s. ¥
In this expression, τ is deﬁned as the generalized mean tariﬀ rate. It is readily shown
that τ = β if all tariﬀse q u a lt h es c a l a rβ (τ = βι). If Σ0Σ were to be the identity
matrix, then τ would coincide exactly with the arithmetic mean of the tariﬀ rates. The
transformation of the tariﬀ rates by the matrix Σ0Σ leads to the use of the qualiﬁer
"generalized" in the name of τ as the generalized mean tariﬀ rate. In a similar fashion, V
would be the conventional variance of the tariﬀ rates if Σ0Σ h a db e e nt h ei d e n t i t ym a t r i x ;
again, use of matrix Σ0Σ in the deﬁnition leads to the use of "generalized" in the name
of V . The generalized variance will be positive unless all tariﬀ rates are equal, in which
case it becomes zero. Clearly, therefore, τ and V respectively measure the level and the
dispersion of the tariﬀ rates.
Proposition 5 is useful in that it provides a description of the sources of welfare gain
from the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform expressed in terms of the level and dispersion of
the initial tariﬀ rates. This formula has several interesting features and properties. First,
both the mean and variance enter the formula positively, meaning that the welfare gain
is higher the greater is the generalized mean and the greater is the generalized variance.
Second, this implies that the welfare gain from a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform is greater
the higher is the overall level of tariﬀs as measured by the generalized mean, τ.T h i s
makes sense, since large distortions suggest that tariﬀ reform will be eﬀective. Third, it
a l s oi m p l i e st h a tt h ew e l f a r eg a i ni sg r e a t e rt h eg r e a t e ri st h eo v e r a l ld i s p e r s i o no ft h e
tariﬀ rates, as measured by the generalized variance, V . This indicates that it is not just
18levels, but dispersion of tariﬀ rates that characterize distortions. Fourth, the generalized
mean and variance measure diﬀerent aspects of the tariﬀ distortion. Even if the variance
is zero, there is still a distortion if the uniform tariﬀ rate on non-numeraire goods is non-
zero (and the tariﬀ on the numeraire is zero, it is recalled). Conversely, even if the mean
tariﬀ rate were zero, there would be a distortion if the tariﬀ rates were dispersed (they
are non-zero).
3.2 The Anderson-Neary Welfare Gain Decomposition
Anderson and Neary (2006) have recently introduced the idea of describing tariﬀ reforms
in terms of changes in the generalized mean and generalized variance of the tariﬀ structure.
They show that the change in welfare from an arbitrary tariﬀ reform may be expressed in
terms of these changes in the generalized mean and generalized variance. In the following,
we use this idea to evaluate the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform. Speciﬁcally, we obtain their
decomposition, which applies to any arbitrary tariﬀ reform, and then use it to examine
the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform. Our derivation is diﬀerent from theirs and so provides
an alternative access to their result.
Proposition 6 (Anderson and Neary, 2005). The change in welfare from an arbitrary
(non-numeraire) tariﬀ reform, dτ, may be expressed as
HdU = τ
0Σ




where s ≡− ι0Σι>0, τAN ≡− ι0Στ/s, dτAN ≡− ι0Σdτ/s and dV AN ≡ 2(τ−ιτAN)0Σdτ/s.
Proof. Consider any scalar τ and let ι be a vector of ones. Write the change in utility
as HdU = τ0Σ0dτ =( τ −ιτ +ιτ)0Σ(dτ −ιdτ +ιdτ)=( τ −ιτ)0Σ(dτ −ιdτ)+τι0Σιdτ +(τ −
ιτ)0Σιdτ +τι0Σ(dτ −ιdτ)=( τ −ιτ)0Σdτ +τι0Σιdτ +τι0Σ(dτ −ιdτ). Deﬁne s ≡− ι0Σι>0,
τAN ≡− ι0Στ/s, dτAN ≡− ι0Σdτ/s and dV AN ≡ 2(τ − ιτAN)0Σdτ/s. Then, replacing τ
by τAN and dτ by dτAN everywhere, the ﬁrst term in the welfare change expression is
1
2sV AN, while the second term becomes sτANdτAN. Finally, the third term becomes zero.
Thus, the change in utility is as expressed in the proposition. ¥
19Several remarks concerning the interpretation of this proposition and its distinction
from Proposition 5 are in order. First, this proposition (virtually) yields the Anderson-
Neary result.14 This derivation, which diﬀers from that of Anderson and Neary, has the
advantage of showing how the welfare change is decomposed, and why their deﬁnitions
arise "naturally" and how they work. Second, our construction merely deﬁnes the change
in the generalized variance. The generalized variance itself does not enter the expressions,
but may be deﬁned, as in Anderson and Neary, as V AN ≡ (τ −ιτAN)0Σ(τ −ιτAN). Notice,
also, that the Anderson and Neary formulae involve the negative deﬁnite "generalizing
matrix" Σ, whereas our deﬁn i t i o n sf u r t h e ra b o v ei n v o l v et h ep o s i t i v ed e ﬁnite matrix Σ0Σ.
Third, while the two propositions both provide expressions for the welfare gain from a
tariﬀ reform, Proposition 6 provides this for an arbitrary reform while Proposition 5 is
concerned only with the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform. Fourth, while both propositions
use the concept of generalized means and variances, Proposition 6 is expressed mainly in
terms of changes in these measures implied by the tariﬀ reform, whereas our Proposition
5 is concerned with the generalized means and variances of the initial tariﬀ structure.
(As noted above, the generalized variance itself is redundant in Anderson and Neary’s
proposition.)
This remark inﬂuences how the two propositions are to be interpreted and analyzed.
The larger are our generalized means and variance, the greater the tariﬀ distortion and
hence the great is the welfare gain from the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform (which, being
locally optimal, determines the greatest attainable gain). By contrast, Proposition 6 shows
that the greater the reduction in Anderson and Neary generalized mean and variance,
the greater the welfare gain. Accordingly, although the generalized mean and variance
concepts are diﬀerent, the two propositions have complementary interpretations.
Anderson and Neary use their decomposition to analyze various tariﬀ reform formulae
that have been proposed in the literature, such as the proportional tariﬀ reduction, a
proportional reduction to a uniform rate and the concertina reform. Here we examine the
change in Anderson and Neary’s generalized mean and variance for the steepest ascent
14We use the qualiﬁer "virtually" because we have not expressed the result in terms of their ad valorem
rates T = π−1t,w h e r eπ is the matrix diagonalization of vector π. This can be done easily, but is not
necessary for our purposes. Numerically, our result coincides exactly with theirs.
20tariﬀ reform. This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The changes in the Anderson-Neary generalized mean and variance for














Proof. These results follow by substituting dτ = Στ into the expressions for the
changes in the generalized mean and variance and simplifying. ¥
It does not appear to be possible to sign these expressions in general. Neither is a
quadratic form; indeed, both are bilinear forms. An examination of these expressions sug-
gests that either sign is possible, depending upon the initial conditions, for the change in
the Anderson-Neary generalized mean and variance arising from the steepest ascent tariﬀ
reform (even for three products). This conclusion was conﬁrmed by numerical simulations
of example problems (to be reported on further below). Most example problems involved
a reduction in both the generalized mean and variance, which implies that the steepest
ascent tariﬀ reform reduced both sources of distortion (mean and variance) and so both
reductions lead to welfare gains, in accordance with Anderson and Neary’s results. How-
ever, some example problems exhibited an increase in the mean and a reduction in the
variance, for instance. In such cases, the Anderson and Neary decomposition in Proposi-
tion 7 is not helpful in establishing whether a welfare gain occurs. On the other hand, we
k n o wt h a tt h e r ei sa l w a y saw e l f a r eg a i nf r o mt h eu s eo ft h es t e e p e s ta s c e n tt a r i ﬀ reform.
4W e l f a r e E ﬃciency of Existing Tariﬀ Reforms
Having examined in detail the properties of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, we now
compare it with the well-known reforms examined in detail in the existing literature.
We start with some theoretical results concerning the optimality of some existing tariﬀ
reforms, then compare these reforms and ﬁn a l l ym o v eo nt os o m en u m e r i c a ls i m u l a t i o n s
that exemplify the main points of our analysis.
21Since the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform is locally optimal, it forms a benchmark by
which any other tariﬀ reform formula may be evaluated. The two most familiar tariﬀ
reforms for a small open economy are (a) proportional reductions in all tariﬀs and (b) the
concertina tariﬀ reform, whereby the highest ad valorem rate is reduced (or the lowest ad
valorem rate is increased). The concertina reform is simply a univariate reform, where
the good is chosen with special characteristics. Formally the proportional and univariate







i = −le i, (i =1 ,2,...,n), (16)
where ei is the ith unit vector. These direction vector have the property that they are
of length l, as is our steepest ascent tariﬀ reform vector, δ
S. The implied tariﬀ reform




P. Throughout this sub-section, we allow reforms of the tariﬀs of all commodities,
but note below that similar results hold when the reforms are restricted to the tariﬀso f
non-numeraire goods.
The conditions under which these two tariﬀ reforms yield an increase in welfare are well
known. The proportional tariﬀ reform yields a welfare gain without any special conditions
on the substitution matrix; all that is needed is that a tariﬀ distortion exists and that
preferences satisfy the Hatta normality condition. The second of the above reforms is
a univariate reform in that it involves the reduction of the tariﬀ on good i alone. The
concertina result is that a welfare gain occurs for a unilateral reduction in the tariﬀ on
good i under the assumption that good i has the highest ad valorem tariﬀ rate and that
all other goods are net substitutes for good i, in addition to the normality of preferences.
W h i l ei ti so b v i o u st h a tt h e s er e f o r m sd on o tc o i n c i d ew i t ht h ec h a r a c t e r i z a t i o no f
locally optimal reforms and, hence, are locally sub-optimal, it is nevertheless interesting
that each violates the requirements set out in Proposition 2. For example, while the
proportional reform involves all tariﬀs and hence satisﬁes one of the conditions demanded
by local optimality, it violates the requirement of the proposition that at least one tariﬀ
22rate increases.15 In a similar vein, the concertina reform violates the proposition in that
it only involves one tariﬀ reduction rather than a change in all tariﬀ rates.
It is evident from the deﬁnition of a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, that other piecemeal
tariﬀ reforms must be locally sub-optimal. Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare these
reforms. To fairly compare piecemeal reforms, it is necessary to limit the lengths of the
reforms to be identical, as has been done in the deﬁnitions above. Then the comparison
reduces to comparing directions of reform on a sphere.
The welfare changes arising from the steepest ascent, proportional and univariate












































where H is the previously deﬁned Hatta normality term.16,17
The formulae for welfare changes arising from the steepest ascent, proportional and
univariate tariﬀ reforms may be used to provide a comparison of welfare gains from the
various reforms. Before undertaking this comparison, however, we establish conditions
under which the proportional and univariate tariﬀ reforms are locally optimal.
Although it is clear from the deﬁnition of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform that any
other tariﬀ reform (of equal length) cannot do better than the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform
in terms of raising welfare, the interesting question arises as to whether a particular tariﬀ
15This presumes all tariﬀs are positive. If some are negative, this formula increases the rate towards
zero.
16The second expression for the welfare gain arising from the steepest ascent reform is obtained by
noting the deﬁnition of the length for a vector and applying it to the distortion vector Sππ(π0,u 0)t0 to
get the relationship
° °Sππ(π0,u 0)t0° ° =[ t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)Sππ(π0,u 0)t0]1/2.
17It is worth noting that the same welfare expression, aparrt from a constant, is obtained if the propor-
tional tariﬀ reform is generalized to a linear tariﬀ reform of the form dt =( γt0+βp)dα,w h e r eγ −β<0.
In this case, Hd u / d α= D(t0,γt 0 + βp)= t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)(γt0 + βp)=( γ − β) t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)t0,s i n c e
homogenetity implies that Sππ(π0,u 0)(p + t0)=0 .W h e n β =0and γ = −1 the proportional tariﬀ
reduction is obtained. In general, a linear reform yields an increase in utility provided that γ − β<0.
23reform can do as well as the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform and, hence, be locally optimal.
If it can achieve this outcome, it is also interesting to establish the conditions required
for local optimality. This is a question that does not appear to have been previously
addressed in the literature.
4.1 Proportional Tariﬀ Reduction Reform
First, we consider the proportional tariﬀ reform. We ask whether and, if so, under what
circumstances will the proportional tariﬀ reduction reform be locally optimal. The answer
is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The proportional tariﬀ reduction reform is locally optimal if, and only if,
the initial tariﬀ vector, t0, is an eigenvector of the substitution matrix Sππ(π0,u 0).
Proof. This result is proved using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (Apostol, 1957,
p.6), which states that kxk·k yk ≥ |x0y| for any two n-dimensional vectors x and y.I n
t h ef o l l o w i n g ,w el e tx0 = t00Sππ(π0,u 0) and y = t0 and apply the inequality to get that
|t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)t0| ≤ kt00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)k·kt0k. Using this inequality and equation (18), we ob-
tain that HduP/dα = D(t0,e δ
P
)=−(l/kt0k) t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)t0 =( l/kt0k) |t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)t0| ≤
(l/kt0k) kt00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)k·kt0k = HduP/dα. The equality in the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
i t yo c c u r si f ,a n do n l yi f ,t h ev e c t o r sa r ep r o portional to one another. This means that
Sππ(π0,u 0)t0 = κt0 for some scalar κ. This, in turn, means that κ is an eigenvalue for
matrix Sππ(π0,u 0) and that t0 is the corresponding eigenvector. The substitution matrix
is a symmetric, negative semi-deﬁnite matrix and so has n real eigenvalues and corre-
sponding eigenvectors. Thus, there exist n real valued eigenvectors of the substitution
matrix Sππ(π0,u 0). If the initial tariﬀ vector coincides with any one of these vectors, then
|t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)t0| = kt00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)k·k t0k (by the the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality) and so
duP/dα = duS/dα. If the initial tariﬀ is not equal to one of these eigenvectors, then the
strict inequality |t00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)t0| < kt00S0
ππ(π0,u 0)k·k t0k holds in the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality and so duP/dα < duS/dα. ¥
This proposition characterizes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which the
proportional reduction reform is locally optimal. Of course, the condition holds trivially
24when t0 =0(free trade) and when t0 is proportional to π0 (eﬀectively free trade), but
it may also hold at a non-trivial tariﬀ vector that is an eigenvector for the substitution
matrix. If the initial tariﬀ vector is an eigenvector, local optimality of the proportional
reduction reform is assured.
While these two propositions about the optimality of the proportional tariﬀ reduction
reform relate to reforms of the tariﬀs on all goods, they may be readily extended to
reforms on the tariﬀs of non-numeraire goods only. In the above statements and proofs,
we simply restrict attention to non-numeraire goods and so replace δ
S by δ
S
ρ, t0 by τ0
and Sππ by Sρρ. To illustrate this, consider the case of just two goods with good 1 as
the untaxed numeraire. Then the subscript ρ simply refers to good 2 and the various
non-numeraire vectors and matrices become scalars. It is then easily shown that the
Cauchy-Schwarz relationship holds with equality and so the proportional reduction of the
tariﬀ on good 2 (the only tariﬀ) is optimal. In the general, many good case, it remains
the case that optimality of the proportional tariﬀ reduction policy for all non-numeraire
goods is optimal if, and only if, the non-numeraire tariﬀ vector is an eigenvector for the
non-numeraire substitution matrix.
4.2 Univariate Tariﬀ Reduction Reform
We now consider the conditions under which a univariate tariﬀ reform, in which the tariﬀ
on a single good is reduced, is locally optimal.
Proposition 9 Let the substitution matrix Sππ(π0,u 0) be of maximal rank, n − 1.T h e n
the univariate tariﬀ reform, in which the tariﬀ on good 1 (for example) is reduced,
is locally optimal if, and only if, the initial tariﬀ vector satisﬁes the condition τ0 =
−Sρρ(π0,u 0)−1Sρ1t0
1.
Proof. The equality in the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality occurs if, and only if, the
vectors are proportional to one another and, in the present context, this means that
Sππ(π0,u 0)t0 = κei for some scalar κ. This equality constitutes a set of n linear equations
that the vector t0 is to satisfy. Since the rank of the substitution matrix is assumed to be
n−1, one equation (say the ith) may be ignored, leaving n−1 equations in n unknowns.
25Tariﬀ t0
i may be arbitrarily chosen and these equations may be solved for the remaining
tariﬀs. For simplicity of notation, and without loss of generality, let i =1 .T h e n t h e
equations to solve are Sρρ(π0,u 0)τ0 = −Sρ1t0
1 and the solution is τ0 = −Sρρ(π0,u 0)−1Sρ1t0
1.
Thus, if the initial tariﬀ vector satisﬁes these equations then the equality in the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality holds and so du1 = duS. If these equations do not hold, then the
strict inequality |t00Sππ(π0,u 0)e1| < kt00Sππ(π0,u 0)k holds and so du1 <d u S.F o rt h ec a s e
where i 6=1t h ea r g u m e n ti se x a c t l yt h es a m ee x c e p tt h a tt h en o t a t i o nn e e d sa m e n d m e n t .
The simplest approach is to re-order goods so that good i becomes the ﬁrst and then our
proof applies. Alternatively, the condition becomes t0
−i = −S−i,−i(π0,u 0)−1S−i,it0
i,w h e r e
the notation −i denotes all the rows or columns except the ith ones.¥
Again, just as in the discussion of the local optimality of the proportional tariﬀ reform,
this proposition may also be readily extended to the case where reforms are restricted
to non-numeraire goods. In the special case of just two goods, with good 1 being the
untaxed numeraire, the reduction of the tariﬀ on good 2 (the only tariﬀ)i si d e n t i c a l
to the proportional tax reform and both are locally optimal. More generally, the above
proposition indicates the conditions under which the univariate reform is locally optimal.
4.3 Comparisons of Reform Directions
Using the fact that the gradient vector and steepest ascent tariﬀ reform vector are the
same except for length and related by equation (3), the welfare changes for the steepest


























These expressions show that the sign of the change in utility depends upon the inner
product between the normalized steepest ascent direction vector e δ
S
and the direction of
the reform in question. For example, the change in utility for the steepest ascent reform is
proportional to e δ
S0e δ
S
, which is always positive. The change in utility for the proportional
26tariﬀ reduction reform is proportional to −e δ
S0
t0, which is always positive since −t0 and
e δ
S
are at an acute angle to each other (implication of the fact that duP > 0). Finally,
the change in utility for a univariate reduction in the tariﬀ on product i is proportional
to −e δ
S0
ei. Whether this reform is welfare improving depends on whether −ei and e δ
S
are
at an acute angle to each other; if good i is a concertina good, then the angle is acute.
These observations provide a geometric interpretation of the directions of reform that
will be welfare improving. Figure 4 illustrates various reforms. Any reforms that are
at an acute angle with e δ
S
will be welfare improving. Conversely, any reforms that are
orthogonal to e δ
S
or at an obtuse angle to e δ
S
will yield zero welfare gains or welfare losses
respectively. These reforms have direction vectors pointing along the tangent plane TT or
pointing in the half-space to the south-east of TT. Another implication is that the closer
a reform vector is to e δ
S
















Figure 4: Directions of Tariﬀ Reform and Welfare Gains
In this ﬁgure, which illustrates one possibility and not a general result, the reform
that yields the welfare gain closest to that attained by the steepest ascent reform is the
reduction in the tariﬀ on good 1 (e δ
i
). Next comes the proportional tariﬀ reduction reform
27(e δ
P
), followed in last place by the reduction in the tariﬀ on good 2, a reform that yields a
welfare loss. The proportional tariﬀ reduction reform yields modest welfare gains since it
reduces both tariﬀs, while the locally optimal reform calls for an increase in the tariﬀ on
good 2. The reform reducing the tariﬀ on good 1 alone does much better and its welfare
gain is close to that of the steepest ascent reform. The reduction of the tariﬀ on good 2
is a bad choice of policy in this second best framework.
The above comparisons of the welfare consequences of various tariﬀ reforms with the
locally optimal steepest ascent tariﬀ reform leads to a general eﬃciency measure that can
be applied to any reform. If δ is the (normalized) direction of an arbitrarily given tariﬀ
reform dt = δdα and δ
S is that for the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, the index of the






This index is close to unity if the direction of tariﬀ reform given by δ is close to δ
S,
meaning that the angle between them is small. Conversely, if these reform directions are
orthogonal, the index is zero and the reform does not yield a gain in utility. If the reform
direction δ is at an obtuse angle to δ
S then there will be a welfare loss associated with
the reform. This index is used on numerical examples below.
4.4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we undertake some calculations of welfare gains from the steepest ascent,
proportional and univariate tariﬀ reforms using numerical examples. By undertaking
these numerical simulations, we are able to gain some further insights into the welfare
eﬀectiveness of these tariﬀ reforms. We begin with a three commodity example and then
p r o v i d er e s u l t sf o ran i n ec o m m o d i t yc a s e .
284.4.1 Example with three goods
In the ﬁrst example there are three traded goods. The world price, speciﬁct a r i ﬀ and



























The steepest ascent tariﬀ direction is given by the gradient vector ∇U(t0),w h i c h ,













This reform calls for an increase in the tariﬀ on the ﬁrst good and reductions in the
tariﬀs on the other two goods. If this tariﬀ reform is undertaken, with the reform length
normalized to be unity, the change in utility is duS =0 .921.
Now consider the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform if it is further required that the reform
only involves non-numeraire goods. In this case, the ﬁrst element of the gradient vector
is ignored and the reform is set equal to the second and third elements. This reform calls
for reductions in tariﬀs on goods two and three, leaving the tariﬀ on good 1 at zero. If
this tariﬀ reform is undertaken, with the reform length normalized to be unity, the change
in utility is duS =0 .565. Although this might seem puzzling at ﬁrst, we have eﬀectively
lost one policy instrument and are now in a second best, piecemeal policy situation.
Consequently, the welfare increase is less than if we had the full set of instruments at our
29disposal.18
Any other tariﬀ reform (of the same length) must give a lower utility gain and so
is locally suboptimal.19 The utility gains for several other reforms of equal length were
calculated. These were (a) proportional reductions in all non-numeraire tariﬀs, (b) reduc-
tions of the tariﬀs on each non-numeraire good taken one at a time and (c) a reduction
of the tariﬀso na l ln o n - n u m e r a i r eg o o d s( g o o d s2a n d3 ) . T h ew e l f a r eg a i n sf o re a c h
reform were expressed as a proportion of the welfare gain for the steepest ascent tariﬀ
reform. This exercise was undertaken twice - once where the reforms were restricted to
non-numeraire goods only and then when the reforms applied to all goods. The resulting
indices of welfare gain relative to the maximum gain that is feasible (given by the steepest
ascent reform), given by (23), are presented in Table 1.
T a b l e1 :I n d i c e so fW e l f a r eG a i nf r o mV a r i o u sT a r i ﬀ Reforms: Example with Three Goods
Goods Subject to Reform
Tariﬀ Reform Non-numeraire All goods
Steepest Ascent 1.01 .0
Proportional .95 .58
Good 2 .94 .57
Good 3 .35 .22
Goods 2-3 .91 .56
Looking at the results for the gains relative to those for the steepest ascent tariﬀ
reform applied to non-numeraire goods only, w es e et h a tt h ep r o p o r t i o n a lr e f o r mw o r k s
very well, yielding 95% of the potential (steepest ascent) gain. This is because the initial
conditions call for a reduction in the tariﬀ r a t e so nb o t hn o n - n u m e r a i r eg o o d s . 20 The
initial equilibrium is such that good 2 is a concertina good - it has the highest ad valorem
tariﬀ rate (expressed in domestic prices) and good 2 is a net substitute for the other
18This example accordingly provides a concrete illustration of Proposition 4, which states that there
is a welfare loss associated with a tariﬀ reform restricted to non-numeraire goods compared to a reform
of the tariﬀ rates of all goods. The welfare loss arises because of the restriction of reforms to a common
sphere. Without this restriction, there would be no welfare loss, of course.
19We must restrict all reforms to be of the same length to permit a valid comparison of these reforms.
20In other examples that call for increases in tariﬀs on some goods, the proportional reduction reform
performs less well and, sometimes, poorly, as might be expected.
30goods (S2j > 0 for j 6=2 ). Hence, the reduction of the tariﬀ on good 2 yields a large
welfare improvement of du2 =0 .94 and, indeed, this reform performs almost as well as
the proportional reduction reform. Good 3 is not a concertina good, but a reduction
of its tariﬀ nevertheless yields a more modest welfare improvement of du3 =0 .35.T h e
reduction of tariﬀs on both non-numeraire goods (non-proportionally) is not as eﬀective
as the reduction of the tariﬀ of good 3 alone, which is where the biggest distortion lies.
When comparisons are made with the steepest ascent reform applied to all goods, it is
seen that the other reforms are now much less impressive. While the welfare gains from
each of these reforms is the same as when all goods are subject to the reforms (recall
that the tariﬀ on the numeraire good is zero initially), the gain from the steepest ascent
reform is much bigger, as explained further above. This diﬀerence raises an important
issue regarding the choice of context in which to undertake a comparison of piecemeal
reforms.
4.4.2 Example with nine goods
Our second illustrative example is for a model that has n =9goods.21 Table 2 provides
the results for the indices of welfare gains, relative to the steepest ascent reform, arising
from the application of the various tariﬀ reforms to the tariﬀs of non-numeraire goods in
this model.
The results in Table 2 starkly illustrate the observation that there can be wide vari-
ations in the eﬀectiveness of the proportional and univariate (single good) tariﬀ reforms
relative to the (locally optimal) steepest ascent reform even when the reforms are restricted
to tariﬀs of non-numeraire goods.22 In this example, the proportional tariﬀ reform is only
about 29% eﬀective in raising welfare, despite the fact that the gradient vector calls for
a reduction in the tariﬀ of every good except one. The distortion on this good (good
9) is very large, however. Moreover, good 9 has the lowest tariﬀ and is strongly net-
substitutable with every good, except the numeraire. Consequently, it is a concertina
21Details of the initial tariﬀs, prices and substitution matrix used in this example are available from
the authors.
22Many other examples, with diﬀerent numbers of goods and substitution matrices, provided similar
support for this observation.
31Table 2: Indices of Welfare Gain from Various Tariﬀ R e f o r m s :E x a m p l ew i t hN i n eG o o d s
Goods Subject to Reform
Tariﬀ Reform Non-numeraire All goods
Steepest Ascent 1.01 .0
Proportional .289 .287
Good 2 .263 .260
Good 3 .159 .158
Good 4 .095 .094
Good 5 .179 .177
Good 6 .213 .211
Good 7 .015 .014
Good 8 .114 .113
Good 9 −.898 −.889
Goods 2-9 .049 .049
good in reverse - welfare gains arise from raising its tariﬀ, not reducing it as the propor-
tional reform requires. This reduces the eﬀectiveness of the proportional reduction tariﬀ
reform.
The univariate tariﬀ r e f o r m sv a r ys u b s t a n t i a l l yi nt h e i re ﬀectiveness at raising welfare.
For those univariate reforms that raise welfare, the indices of welfare gain vary from a high
of 0.26 when the tariﬀ on good 2 is reduced down to a gain of just 0.01 when the tariﬀ on
good 7 is reduced. Of course, the reduction of the tariﬀ on good 9, which is a concertina
good in reverse, yields a large reduction in the index of welfare gain. Conversely, if the
tariﬀ on this good were to be raised, the index of welfare gain would be large.
As a ﬁnal observation on Table 2, we note that the eﬃciencies of the various reforms
relative to the steepest ascent reform applied to all goods are only marginally less than
their eﬃciencies relative to the steepest ascent reform applied to only non-numeraire
goods. This result for the 9-good example is in contrast with the result noted above for
the 3-good example. This diﬀerence in results suggests that the welfare loss associated
with restricting the steepest ascent reform to non-numeraire goods is smaller, the larger
the number of goods; the restriction on the single numeraire good takes lower importance
due to the larger number of goods whose tariﬀs are reformed.
Before we conclude, we should note that while speciﬁc examples cannot provide general
32conclusions, they do provide valuable illustrations of the relative merits of alternative tariﬀ
reforms in a range of contexts. Our examples illustrate several main observations. First,
the restriction of reforms (of the same length) to non-numeraire goods only can result in a
substantial loss of welfare gain compared to allowing all tariﬀs to be reformed. Second, the
eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent reforms depends crucially upon the initial distortions captured
by the tariﬀ rates and the substitution matrix. Finally, there can be substantial variation
in the welfare eﬀectiveness of the various reforms such as the proportional and univariate
reforms.
5A D i ﬀerent Application: Market Access and SATR
Thus far, we have been concerned with the welfare implications of the steepest ascent tariﬀ
reform. We now turn to the question of how the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform relates to the
issue of market access, as discussed by Ju and Krishna (2000) and Anderson and Neary
(2006). This topic is pertinent for two main reasons. First, the relationship, particularly
the potential conﬂict, between the objectives of increasing market access and of increasing
consumer welfare is interesting in its own right and an important issue in international
trade policy. What are the eﬀects on welfare of tariﬀ reforms designed to increase market
access? Conversely, what is the eﬀect upon market access of reforms that raise consumer
welfare? Are these objectives in conﬂi c to rc a nt h e yb ea t t a i n e db yt h es a m er e f o r m ?
Second, the issue of market access provides an illustration that our concept of a steepest
ascent tariﬀ reform may be applied to objectives other than welfare. Accordingly, we
derive below a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform that locally maximizes the increase in market
access.
Market access is deﬁned as M = q0m(π,u),w h e r eq is the non-numeraire world price
vector and m(π,u) is the vector of import functions of non-numeraire goods. It is assumed
that all goods that are not imported have zero tariﬀsa n da r ea g g r e g a t e di n t ot h en u m e r a i r e
good, which is therefore a composite commodity. As previously, τ is the tariﬀ vector
for non-numeraire goods (the tariﬀ on the numeraire composite good being zero) and
ρ = q + τ is the domestic price vector for non-numeraire goods. Under these deﬁnitions,
33market access, M, is the value of imports at world prices. The change in market access
a sar e s u l to fat a r i ﬀ change is
dM =( q + Mbτ)
0Σ
0dτ, (26)
where Mb = q0mI/(1 − τ0mI) is the marginal propensity to spend on importable com-
modities and mI ≡ (−Sρu/Su) is the extra consumption of imports arising from an extra
dollar of income.
If we use the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform of tariﬀs on non-numeraire goods, dτ =
λΣτdα, then the change in market access is
λ








This may be further expressed in terms of measures of the levels of prices and tariﬀs, the
dispersion of tariﬀs and of a measure of the correlation between prices and tariﬀsa s
λ
−1dM/dα = C + sq τ + Mb(V + sτ
2), (28)
where C ≡ (q − ιq)0Σ0Σ(τ − ιτ) is deﬁned as the generalized covariance between q and τ
and the generalized mean of world prices is deﬁned as q ≡ ι0Σ0Σq/s.
This equation provides an expression for the change in market access that arises from
application of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, which provides the optimal tariﬀ reform (of
tariﬀs of non-numeraire goods) when utility is the objective of the reform. The expression
is fairly complex and ambiguous in sign, but depends on several summary measures of
the initial equilibrium. The greater is the generalized covariance between q and τ,t h e
greater is the change in market access. Similarly, the larger is the generalized variance,
V , the greater will be the change in market access.
Now consider a tariﬀ reform that is steepest ascent for market access, i.e. a reform
that will yield the largest possible increase the world price value of imports. The gradient
of M with respect to tariﬀs is, from above, g = Σ(q + Mbτ) and so the steepest ascent
34tariﬀ reform for market access is δ
M = Σ(q + Mbτ). By construction, this tariﬀ reform
must raise market access unless the gradient vanishes (g =0 ). How is utility aﬀected if
this steepest ascent tariﬀ reform that is locally optimal for market reform is enacted? The
change in utility is given by






=( q + Mbτ)
0Σ
0Στ, (29)
where H = −Su(1 − τ0mI) > 0 (due to the Hatta normality condition).
What is remarkable about this expression (29) for the eﬀect of the market access based
steepest ascent tariﬀ reform upon utility is that it is the same as the expression (27) for
the eﬀect of a utility based steepest ascent tariﬀ reform upon market access, apart from
positive scalar multipliers. That is, λ
−1dM/dα = Hd u / d α=( q + Mbτ)0Σ0Σ.T h u s ,w e
have:
Proposition 10 The eﬀe c to fas t e e p e s ta s c e n tt a r i ﬀ reform directed at utility upon mar-
ket access is precisely the same as the eﬀect of a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform directed
at market access upon utility (apart from positive scalar multipliers). Thus, the steepest
ascent tariﬀ reform directed at market access has a positive eﬀect upon utility if, and only
if, the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform directed at utility has a positive eﬀect upon market
access.
This appears to be an interesting "duality" result between welfare and market access
eﬀects of (diﬀerently based) steepest ascent tariﬀ reforms. Clearly, the implications of
this result for the market access and welfare literature are needed to be developed more
fully. Here we only note this result in order to highlight that our proposed method can
bring new insights to the policy reform literature.
356C o n c l u s i o n s
The steepest ascent tariﬀ reform concept proposed in this paper provides a standard
or benchmark by which other reforms may be compared in terms of their eﬀectiveness
in generating welfare gains. Tariﬀ reforms can, at best, attain the welfare gain that
is achieved by the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, since it is locally optimal. Hitherto,
the tariﬀ reform literature has been focused on establishing reforms that yield a welfare
improvement and has therefore been concerned only with the sign of the welfare eﬀect.
The motivation for the present paper has been two-fold. The ﬁrst has been to characterize
and establish the nature of the tariﬀ reform that is locally optimal and this has yielded
our steepest ascent tariﬀ reform. The second motivation was to provide a benchmark
tariﬀ reform with which all other existing and potential reforms can be compared and to
provide a means of determining their relative eﬃciency in yielding welfare improvements.
The steepest ascent tariﬀ reform also provides this outcome. In other words, our paper
provides a diﬀerent focus from that which has characterized the literature - one which is
upon the size of the welfare eﬀects rather than simply the sign.
We have established several properties of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform, character-
ized the sources of potential gains from tariﬀ reforms and compared the welfare eﬀective-
ness of the proportional and univariate tariﬀ reforms. We have also applied it to the issue
of how tariﬀ reforms aﬀect market access.
Not surprisingly, application of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reform formula to an actual
economy requires knowledge of the net substitution matrix at the initial equilibrium as well
as the initial tariﬀ rates and is therefore demanding in terms of information requirements.
While the econometric estimation of the substitution matrix for a reasonably disaggre-
gated set of commodities is not feasible, there are many computable general equilibrium
models for various countries that have very detailed information about the production
and consumption sectors that enable the computation of this net substitution matrix.23
Accordingly, the calculation of the steepest ascent tariﬀ reforms for such economies is
23A similar issue could be raised with respect to the Anderson and Neary (1996) index of trade restric-
tiveness. However, and as it has been shown by the work of Anderson and Neary (2005) and by recent
work of Kee et al. (2006), such indexes can indeed be measured with relative ease.
36already feasible for many countries thus making the concept of practical policy relevance
as well as being a valuable theoretical benchmark for various reform proposals.
While our steepest ascent tariﬀ reform deﬁnition and the comparison between various
reforms were made on the basis of reforms of equal length, extensions of the concept to
alternative constraints sets can be contemplated. One possibility is to include costs of
making tariﬀ reforms into the model and to restrict the reform vectors to be of equal cost.
Although we have followed the international trade literature in which revenue implication
of reforms are typically not of primary concern, another potentially important possibility
is to require that feasible tariﬀ reforms have the same tariﬀ revenue implications.
F i n a l l y ,i ti sn o t e w o r t h yt h a tt h ec o n c e p to fasteepest ascent or locally optimal policy
reform is not restricted to tariﬀ reform but may be applied to any set of policy instruments.
It could be applied, for example, to quotas on trade. Similarly it could be applied to the
reform of domestic taxes. Also, the concept does not have to be restricted to measuring the
gains in utility of a reform but can be applied to any objective function. As an example,
in this paper we brieﬂy considered a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform where the objective
function was a measure of market access. An alternative objective function might be the
value of production in some domestic industry or in the income of a factor of production,
to give just two additional examples. In short, the concept is applicable whenever we
wish to determine the best possible piecemeal reform in terms of some objective function
or to compare the eﬀectiveness of alternative policy reforms in attaining that objective.
37Appendix: Choice of Policy Instrument
I nt h ep a p e r ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h ep o l i c yi n s t r u m e n ta tt h ed i s p o s a lo ft h e
government comprises the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rates, as is common in the literature. The tariﬀ
reforms consist of changes in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rate vector. The alternative is to assume
that the policy reform is expressed in terms of changes in (a) ad valorem tariﬀ rates, (b)
tariﬀ factor rates or (c) domestic prices. In this appendix, we show how the steepest
ascent concept may be applied to each of these sets of policy instruments.




which makes it clear that the resulting indirect utility function W(π;p,b) is homogeneous
of degree zero in (p,b) and homogeneous of degree zero in π. A little reﬂection, based
on the fact that π0 = p + t0 is additive in t0, indicates that the previous development
of a steepest ascent tariﬀ reform expressed in terms of U(t) may be directly applied to
a steepest ascent reform of domestic prices expressed in terms of W(π), subsuming the






0,λ > 0, (31)











Having established the steepest ascent reform of domestic prices, we can now consider the
nature of reforms of policy instruments that determine the domestic prices.
Second, consider speciﬁct a r i ﬀs (already dealt with in the text of the paper). We write
domestic prices in terms of speciﬁct a r i ﬀsa sπ0 = f(t0) ≡ p+t0 and note that ∇f(t0) ≡ I,
the identity matrix. Thus, to get the steepest ascent speciﬁct a r i ﬀsw ew r i t eU(t) ≡
W(f(t)) and apply the steepest ascent method to obtain ∇U(t) ≡∇ f(t)∇W(f(t)) =
∇W(f(t)).T h i sj u s tc o n ﬁrms that the steepest ascent directions for t and for π are the
38same.
Third, consider ad valorem tariﬀsg i v e nb yτi = ti/pi for i =1 ,2,...,n.W e w r i t e
domestic prices in terms of ad valorem tariﬀsa sπ0 = g(τ0) ≡ p·(1+τ0),w h e r e· denotes
"horizontal" multiplication, and note that ∇f(t0) ≡ P, the matrix diagonalization of the
world price vector, p. Thus, to get the steepest ascent ad valorem tariﬀsw ew r i t eU(τ) ≡
W(g(τ)) and apply the steepest ascent method to obtain ∇U(τ) ≡∇ g(τ)∇W(g(τ)) =











0,λ > 0, (33)
where λ = θ/p0Sπu(π0,u 0) > 0 and b Σ ≡ PS ππ(π0,u 0)P is a negative semideﬁnite matrix.
The ﬁrst line in these expressions shows that the sign structure the ad valorem tariﬀ
direction is the same as for a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, but that the direction itself is diﬀerent because
of the multiplication of the rows by the respective world prices required by the formulae.






0 > 0. (34)
Finally, for completeness, we present results for tariﬀ factors deﬁned as σi =1+τi











= λb Σ(1 − σ
0),λ > 0, (35)






0b Σb Σ(1 − σ
0) > 0. (36)
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